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The economics literature is full of studies of monetary or currency unions ranging from the sterling area before 1914, to the Bretton Woods system later and the euro zone within the European Monetary Union today. A quick search in Econ-Lit returned over 10,000 entries among abstracts and subjects, and a good one thousand titles. None was found for currency or monetary disunion, or fragmentation. Yet, the monetary disintegration that occurred in Spanish America over the period 1800-25, along with the fiscal and political fragmentation that followed the implosion of the Spanish Empire, is one of the most prominent examples of such an economic phenomenon. Moreover, the macroeconomic successful money" in modern western economies and the international means of payment before the days of the gold standard. These "demandside explanations" rely on the force of Chinese demand for silver (manifested in the spectacular price premiums for silver) as the force that drove the birth and expansion of global trade.
2 Spanish possession of American mines and the rents from them were the main cause of Spanish splendour -and decline -between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries.
Thus, authors have centred on the effects of China's demand to explain the demise of the Spanish Empire. Emphasising the importance of the purchasing power of silver, more than the actual quantities of silver produced, Flynn and Giraldez question the "fiscal viability of the (Spanish)
Royal Treasury" by the mid-17 th century. 3 They claim that the fiscal crisis of Imperial Spain was connected to the protracted fall of the value of silver that they indicate occurred somewhere around 1640. Then, the extraordinary profits of silver should have ceased as China's exchange rate reached parity with the silver exchange rate in Europe at the time. In other words, the premium on the export of silver -as commodityended. 4 However, another spurt of silver demand from China occurred in the first half of the 18 th century, when the exchange rate for silver to gold was still 50 per cent higher than the rate in Europe. According to global monetary historians, China's population and market growth -and probably China's expansion to the north -explains this second opportunity for European arbitrage and further trade. Indeed, the Spanish Empire was the largest monetary union ever known. By 1780s within the financial and political strain caused by the Napoleonic wars in Europe, a bankrupted crown and imperial state eventually imploded, opening the way for a series of revolts and revolutions, both in the metropolis and colonies. This led to the colonies'
Independence and the emergence of modern Latin American republics in the early 1800s. The implosion of the Empire resulted in the fragmentation of that monetary union and of the existing political structure. This had consequences for trade and production over a wide economic region that had formerly been highly integrated. Furthermore, some implications for the political development of independent Latin
America can be drawn from these monetary incidents. Contrary to the traditional assumption of the empire as merely a system to extract fiscal revenues to Europe, the colonial "economic system" organised around 
Monetary fragmentation in New Spain-Mexico
New Spain had been the main producer of silver and minter of silver coins in the empire during the 18 th century. 7 Since the 1780s, colonial officials and merchants established in Mexico City had resisted every pressure from similar authorities, miners and merchants in the interior regions to break their monopoly on coinage, and over the attraction of silver to the capital and its Mint. But as silver flowed within the colony -and the world economy -the ebb could not be stopped by zealous cedulas and royal orders. Already in the 1790s, the Crown sought to gain some control on the spillage of silver out of the imperial trading system and treasury. indirectly promotes the insurgency and let's admit it, the single bound that would keep together the provinces with the capital, has been broken".
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During that turbulent decade, both Royalists and Patriots struck very low quality silver coins. 12 These coins were known as the "hammered dollars"
by the US mint, and were distinguishable from the world famous Spanish "pillar dollar" because they were "decidedly inferior, being worth 101 cents on the average -even compared to the 106.3 cents for Mexico latter coins-and withal very irregular". (25%) Durango (13%) Sombrerete (8%) and Chihuahua (2%).
19
However, these neighbouring mining regions had their own mint. On the one hand, differential cost of transport, time to obtain the returns in money and the price of the silver bars taken for smelting and minting were important in the decision of miners to take their metal to one or another place. Thus, overall, relative availability of silver had also to affect the flows and intensity of trade within regions and ultimately overseas. On the other hand, mints in the hands of the states could render extra income from seignorage. Repeated deficits coupled with inelastic public expenditure within a context of very reluctant sources for domestic borrowing had to make attractive the resort to mint houses as sources of revenue. After all debasement and monetary manipulations were anything but new: they had old colonial antecedents. 20 All of this ought to have been reflected in different relative prices or profits for miners and in the quality of pesos coined in these regional mints, namely in the exchange rates of Mexican pesos within the country. 21 This should be considered in addition to transport costs and war damages in assessing the economic capacity of silver mining and the performance of the aggregate economy in nineteenth century Mexico.
Thus, one of the most valuable and traditional features of the Spanish American peso was broken: the standard of quality. Historians have paid little attention to the differences in appearance, fineness or weight of the Mexican silver coins in the post-independence period. 19 Matamala, "De Fondo De Rescate". Appendix. 20 In 1728-1730 the peso piece had been reduced in weight and fineness to 417.6 grains at .9166 fineness (11 dineros): the pillar peso. In 1772 Carlos III lowered the fineness again to .90278 (10 dineros 20 grains) but the weight remained the same in the coins known as the "bust peso". 21 A personal communication from Dr. A. Ibarra (UNAM) about miners in Guadalupe & Calvo avoiding the minting of silver bars, despite having paid all taxes and mint charges, is very indicative. According to his sources, miners had a great incentive to smuggle their silver. Profits from keeping silver in lumps or in bars had to be greater than the costs from seignorage. In the utility function of miners, the risk of adulteration of silver once coined could well explain this otherwise irrational behaviour.
However, scattered evidence presented in the appendix suggests they were wide. Crown officials had already been reluctant to open new mints, and regretted the creation of the provincial mints as "dangerous to the governance of the kingdom". 22 According to historians the postindependence, the Mexican peso initially lost its acceptance "because the world was not used to the new design introduced after 1824" that substituted the bust of Spanish sovereigns for the eagle. In the Philippines, as the "[ruling class] were all royalists, they could not tolerate the circulation of coins proceeding from the provinces in revolt … this it would be a tacit approval of the insurrection in [the Philippines] whereas the sovereign had spared no sacrifice and no effort in the pacification of these republican countries which were now in upheaval and anarchy and unable to guarantee the purity of the metal which they coined".
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In China the Mexican coin was received at 15 per cent below the usual parity for the old Spanish pesos. 24 China had been the main customer for Spanish and Mexican pesos since the sixteenth century.
Whereas the pesos bearing the bust of Carlos IV enjoyed a thirty percent premium on the intrinsic value there, the Chinese soon distinguished the differences between old and new silver coins minted in Spanish America.
Pesos struck in Chile, Bolivia or Peru, for reasons explained below, suffered discounts in Asian markets, whereas Mexican coins traded at premium. Even pesos minted in republican Mexico were not equally regarded, depending on the letter that indicated the original mint house.
Apparently coins struck in Guadalajara were notoriously less favoured 22 Matamala, "La Descentralización", p. 22 with the backing of the Consulados merchants formed guilds from Mexico and Veracruz. They tried to close provisional mints in 1816, but the reaction of miners and merchants in the provinces impeded it. Losses from missing seignorage were estimated at 5% of the Mexico mint's profits. 23 S Perez Gilbert, "Manila Galleons and Mexican Pieces of Eight," Numismática. IV, 18 (1955) 29 Thus, the success of the 1903 monetary reform in Mexico, which allowed the country to adhere to the Gold Standard, is explained by "the success of the (federal) government at surveying the characteristics of coins, which was impossible before According to this well-known notion, if two coins are in circulation, the relative face values of which differ from the relative quality of its bullion content, the dearer coin will be extracted from circulation for melting down or hoarding. This first distortion would generate a consequent phenomenon where "bad money drives out good money".
Revista de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Numismáticos
The observed drainage of specie in post-independent Latin America overall was a result of the hoarding of the good currency within a context of multiple coins in circulation. This would cause distortions in relative prices, fuel speculative pressures, prejudice the creation of capital markets and -given the structure of imports and exports in Colonial Spanish America and the structure of taxation in post colonial republicsprotracted further market fragmentation. Undesirable economic and social effects from the coexistence of diverse coins and paper notes would ultimately foster regional disputes and political disorder during the building of republican institutions in the aftermath of the fall of the Imperial rule.
A Spanish American phenomenon
The monetary chaos extended to other mining economies like New Granada, today Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Already in colonial times, the gold coins minted in both Bogotá and Popayan did not keep up with the Spanish colonial standard. Because of imperial transfers of revenues -the situados -various silver pieces coined at different mints also circulated in the wider region. With the Revolution, Patriots in control of Cartagena in 1811 debased silver coins and minted copper until 1815.
Royalists in Popayan minted silver pieces of any quality or weight. Republican governments in colonies further south also retained the monopoly over the minting of silver coins. They maintained their authority over monetary policy and could therefore collect revenues from seignorage. However, there were significant changes regarding the colonial monetary system that had been in place previously. In Peru the export of silver bars was prohibited, and when coined shipments of silver were subject to a five per cent tax. As the republican government was financially broke, it was unable to make advances upon the metals for coinage so it could not effectively run the mint house. Already by 1826 the mint was operated semi-privately by British merchants, who procured the capital to purchase silver and produced pesos. British Consuls estimated the seignorage at 14 per cent of the silver value. According to the same source there were great advantages in illicit exports of silver piña or uncoined silver, so contraband trade was huge. 39 Yet the same observer 37 Meisel, El Patron Metálico ([cited) . 38 On exports see J Ocampo, Colombia Y La Economía Mundial, 1830 -1910 (Bogota: 1984 As an attempt to change this monetary policy, Bolivia (as well as Peru) introduced a decimal system for the fraction of the peso in 1863.
However, this extravagant debasement continued until the early 1870s. In 1872, exports of silver were finally free and so was minting thereafter.
This reform ended the government monopoly of coinage but created a paper currency, and an incipient government-owned establishment 43 The reform tried to change the existing bi-monetary system resuming the coinage of .902 fineness silver coins, the peso boliviano. However these pieces weighed 400 grains, which made them equivalent to the feeble pesos. In 1865 a further debasement was made to small denomination coins, the notorious Melgarejos, which were worth only 6 dineros, or .500 fineness of pure silver. Alvarez, Temas De Historia Económica Argentina, pp. 97, the assignats during the French revolution, the paper peso of Buenos Aires enjoyed a long if turbulent life of 40 years, until 1867. Buenos Aires' inconvertible paper peso remained in circulation, despite repeated massive issues, because of the fiscal fragmentation that followed the fall of the empire in the River Plate. Receiving paper notes in return for taxes was the mechanism conceived by the Buenos Aires' government to enforce acceptance of the peso as legal tender. Buenos Aires controlled the Customs House at the single port in the region that had access to overseas trade. The bulk of her ordinary income came from duties on imports largely consumed far beyond the province. Duties were paid in paper pesos, the Buenos Aires currency. Thus, this artificial demand for paper notes helped them remain in circulation despite the lack of metallic reserves. As a result Buenos Aires pesos performed far better than other provincial currencies in replacing scarce bullion.
From 1826 the expansion of currency became the ultimate means to meet fiscal deficits in Buenos Aires. With recurrent issues of paper the effects of inflation 'tax' (the erosion of the future value of government obligations due to inflation) were reduced over time. This obliged the government to issue even more money. There were times when the expansion of currency was substantial, so high depreciation followed.
Subsequently inflationary expectations raised the price of hard currency even further and a process of currency substitution began. Gold ounces, silver pesos fuertes or feeble pesos and any other metallic currencies were preferred to worthless paper scrip. Currency substitution was aggravated because inflationary episodes were followed by marked appreciation of the paper peso and deflation. As illustrated by figure 3, high volatility in the exchange rate was a fundamental part of Buenos Aires monetary policy in the period. Hence, post-independent governments throughout the former Spanish Empire issued long term bonds while trying new fiscal recipes.
Yet because of the exhaustion of lenders and the effects of rapid inflation and monetary instability, public bonds never developed as a sound source of finance, and domestic capital markets never took shape.
Budget deficits provoked an early recourse to local merchants for funds.
These private sources lent money or sold goods to the government and received promissory bills, treasury notes, and interest bearing vales to be redeemed at Customs. In fact, the repetition of this practice resulted in a mortgage on future income, and governments either needed more money or received less revenue every time. So the volume of paper scrip increased as the financial mess worsened. 54 Marichal describes the phenomenal rate of borrowing of the Crown from the colonial subjects in the previous years of the Independence. C Marichal, La Bancarrota Del Virreynato. Nueva España Y Las Finanzas Del Imperio Español, 1780 -1810 (Mexico: FCE, 1999 . Not surprisingly, effective interest rates skyrocketed, tax burden 55 As Tenenbaum notes, Mexican governments both Federalists and Centralists, "rather than reform the tax system, … searched for ways to buy time until the system began to work as planned. B Tenenbaum, The Politics of Penury: Debts and Taxes in Mexico, 1821 -1856 (Austin: 1986 increased with higher tariffs of multiplied with newer levies, and the yet fiscal income became slimmer. 56 With foreign credit curtailed, local moneylenders financed the Government at allegedly "usurious" rates. In 1840, although Treasury expenditure was listed as 12.5 million pesos, only $2,375,314 corresponded to actual spending. The remaining 10 millions pesos were defrayments for loans, interests payments and repayment of money on deposit in the Treasury, namely "4.21 pesos for every one for genuine expenses". 57 Hence, every government had to borrow even more in every year, but at shorter terms and facing higher interests rates, than their predecessors.
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The inter-temporal budget constraint arising from further borrowing at more expensive rates, while committing future revenues to service the debt, ended in astronomical rates of debt burden. 59 Borrowing at everhigher rates and shorter terms of maturity was a secure way to build up a debt crisis. Nineteenth-century European experts considered a 35 per cent interest service to revenues ratio with the "greatest prudence"; above 45 per cent "the situation looked bleak"; and when reaching 55 to 60 per cent "the slightest problem shall induce to restructuring". 60 America was very high, and much higher than elsewhere during the first age of globalisation. As has been widely referred to in the literature, the authors also observe that early republican governments had strong fiscal objectives driving the tariff policy. So tariff was a "revenue source and a protective device for special interests", which precluded the gains from trade and further integration into the global economy.
However, if Custom duties were paid with depreciated paper money and bonds that circulated at huge discounts in secondary markets, Economic growth measured at the federal or national level may have stagnated but certain regions within a country outperformed others.
Disparities, regional and within countries, broadened after independence.
Thus, widening inequalities affected the prospect for sustainable growth over time and fuelled persistent regional conflicts. 
